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Unemployment has been very high in a number of European coun-
tries for almost three decades. Many economists ascribe the problem
to lack of competition in labor markets plagued by institutional ri-
gidities, such as employment protection, generous unemployment
benefits, compression in relative wages as a result of collective bar-
gaining, and so on. Few countries have removed these rigidities, how-
ever. Instead, governments have developed a lot of (often very costly)
policies with dubious effects, including permanent budget deficits, relief
jobs in the public sector that do little to enhance the job prospects of
the long-term unemployed, and voodoo economics such as working-
time reduction. Some marginal reforms may have had an effect, as in
the case of the liberalization of temporary contracts in Spain and
other countries in the 1980s and 1990s or France’s recent reform of
its unemployment benefit system to monitor job search efforts. A
detailed look at the history of labor market reforms in several Euro-
pean countries reveals the following characteristics. First, reforms
are numerous and amount to an accumulation of small changes. Sec-
ond, some reforms tend to increase labor market flexibility, while
others tend to reduce it. Third, it is quite difficult to assess the mag-
nitude of the impact of individual reforms and, in particular, whether
they have made European labor markets more competitive.
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The degree of labor market competition may also be affected by
developments such as increases in product market competition as a
result of deregulation or increased openness to international trade.
Such changes may help reduce European unemployment and thus
spare painful reforms of the labor market—although groups that ben-
efit from labor rigidities have an interest in blocking these changes.1
Consequently, labor market competition might increase even in the
absence of labor market reforms.
Rather than looking directly at policy measures, this paper looks
at the evolution of some quantitative measures of labor market com-
petition. Specifically, I look at the evolution of two very different mea-
sures of labor market competition in a number of European countries
between 1994 and 2000. The first measure captures interindustry
differences in wages, while the second is a proxy for the welfare dif-
ference, in present discounted value terms, between the employed
and the unemployed.
1. RENTS AND THEIR MEANING
I define the rent of an employed worker as the present discounted
value of his or her expected flow of future incomes, minus the present
discounted value of the income flow of an unemployed worker with
similar characteristics. This measure indicates how uncompetitive
the labor market is. In a perfectly competitive labor market, the un-
employed would be able to underbid the employed to the point that
people would be indifferent between being employed or unemployed.
That may mean full employment, in which case an unemployed per-
son would immediately find a job, such that his or her situation would
in effect be no different from that of an employed person. Alterna-
tively, it may mean that the wage has fallen to the level of unemploy-
ment benefits (adjusted for the disutility of effort), in which case there
is voluntary unemployment in the sense that the unemployed are
indifferent about getting a job.
The rent also identifies how much workers lose when they lose
their job. In a no-rent society, the risk of job loss is not a risk at all.
People are insured against it by the perfectly competitive labor mar-
ket, which makes them indifferent between working and not working.
1. See Blanchard and Philippon (2003) for an analysis.Did European Labor Markets Become More Competitive 283
All the implications of job loss being painful derive from the fact that
employed workers have rents.
Rents may originate from microeconomic frictions, which pre-
vent the labor market from being competitive. The theoretical litera-
ture identifies a number of channels. The efficiency wage theory, for
example, states that it is costly for firms to monitor their workers’
effort level.2 They therefore prefer to pay above market-clearing wages
so as to deter shirking. This theory implies that the rent will rise in
line with the severity of the informational problems associated with
observing effort. The insider-outsider theory, in turn, states that firms
have sunk specific investments in locating and training workers, which
generates a hold-up problem.3 Once the investment is paid for, the
worker can expropriate part of it by asking above market-clearing
wages. This theory predicts that rents will be higher for jobs requir-
ing larger specific investments ex ante.4 It also predicts that larger
rents will be accompanied by greater workers’ bargaining power
—that is, the share of the total surplus that they are able to appropri-
ate, although there is no straightforward empirical equivalent of that
parameter. The search-and-matching theory extends the insider-out-
sider theory to a general equilibrium framework in which there is a
per-unit-of-time cost of maintaining a vacancy and in which the rate
at which vacancies are filled depends on the ratio between the stock
of unemployment and the stock of vacancies.5 The tighter the labor
market, the longer it takes to fill a vacancy—which raises both the
sunk costs of hiring and rents. The theory thus predicts a positive
relation between rents and labor market tightness. It also predicts
that higher rents raise the cost of vacancies and lower the efficiency
of the process of matching workers and firms. Finally, union-wage-
setting models directly generate rents, as unions act as monopolies
in the labor market.
All these models further predict that a number of labor market regu-
lations affect the rent. Firing costs increase the rent under all of the
models. In the efficiency wage model, it makes it more costly to dismiss
workers when they have been caught shirking, which raises the rent
that must be paid to deter the behavior. In the insider-outsider model,
2. See Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984); Solow (1979); Schlicht (1978).
3. See Lindbeck and Snower (1988); Blanchard and Summers (1986); Layard,
Nickell, and Jackman (1990).
4. The macroeconomic consequences of the degree of specificity in invest-
ments are explored by Caballero and Hammour (1998).
5. See, for example, Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).284 Gilles Saint-Paul
it acts as a sunk cost, as it must be paid to get rid of any workers in
order to replace them with others. Minimum wages directly increase
the rent for those employed workers for whom they are binding. Work
rules may also increase rents to the extent that they impose specific
investments on firms and more generally reduce competition among
workers.
Product market regulation also affects rents. By increasing mo-
nopoly power, regulation increases a firm’s total revenue per worker;
the rent is increased as long as the workers have some ability to
seize part of that revenue. Under union-wage-setting models, work-
ers’ rents are linked to product market competition via a simple law
of derived demand. A more regulated product market implies a lower
price-elasticity of demand for each firm, which in turn implies a lower
wage-elasticity of labor demand and thus a higher wage.
I now briefly discuss the political consequences of rents.6 The
observation made above, that rents show how much workers lose
when they lose their job, implies that in an economy with rents, work-
ers have a general aversion to job loss—the more so, the greater the
rent. Incumbent employees tend to oppose policies that threaten their
jobs and to promote policies that protect them. That incentive would
be absent in an economy without rents. If rents differ among work-
ers, then workers will support different policies, with workers with
greater rents in favor of increasing protection.
This implies that greater rents heighten support for employment
protection legislation. Since employment protection itself also tends
to increase rents, the system involves a mutual feedback mechanism.
Beyond that, any shift that tends to increase rents should enhance
support for employment protection. Thus, political support for em-
ployment protection should be higher after a hike in the minimum
wage, after a period of tight labor markets, or after any technological
or organizational change that reduces a firm’s ability to monitor work-
ers or raises its required specific investment in a job.
Rents also easily generate political-economic complementarities
between different labor market institutions. By a political-economic
complementarity between institution A and institution B, I mean that
the political support for institution A is greater if institution B is in
place, and vice-versa. As I just argued, institutions that create (or
increase) rents increase the political support for employment protec-
tion. Employment protection itself, however, increases the political
6. See Saint-Paul (1997, 2000, 2002) for an analytical treatment.Did European Labor Markets Become More Competitive 285
support from employed workers for institutions that create rents,
because it reduces their exposure to unemployment and thus their
prospects of losing the rent. Political-economic complementarities
imply that a comprehensive labor market reform will have more sup-
port than a piecemeal approach.
While rents increase the support for institutions that directly in-
crease employment protection, they also have a pervasive effect on
the way people view most policy changes. When the rent is high,
incumbent employees have a vested interest in opposing policies that
threaten their jobs. This means that any policy change that implies
some labor reallocation will face greater political opposition in econo-
mies with high rents.7 This applies to trade liberalization, changes in
the level and structure of government spending, and so on. In other
words, rents tend to generate a bias in favor of the status quo in
virtually any policy area.
The story of labor market flexibility in Europe in the 1990s is
very much that of a half-full, half-empty glass: measures that increased
labor flexibility alternated with measures that reduced it. As a re-
sult, rents will not necessarily have fallen, but their evolution in a
given country may illustrate which reforms had the strongest effects.
At the same time, increased trade integration and deregulation in
product markets is a clear trend that should push rents downward.
2. MEASURING COMPETITION IN EUROPEAN LABOR MARKETS
There are various ways to assess whether European labor mar-
kets are becoming more competitive. One possibility is to construct
indices of labor market regulation and look at their evolution over
time in different countries. This approach has mostly been pioneered
by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD).8 The reliability of these indices depends on how quantitative
the underlying variables are, together with the accuracy of the
researcher’s assessment of the importance of a given change in regu-
lation. In some cases, it is easy to construct an index because the
regulation being measured has a clear quantitative definition. This is
the case, for example, for unemployment benefits, for which fairly
7. See Saint-Paul (1996b).
8. Typical examples include Grubb and Wells (1993) and the OECD’s job study
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reliable indices of replacement ratios have been constructed. Even in
such a case, however, the index is not fully accurate because it fails
to capture the diversity of individual situations and the way the un-
employment benefit system is actually administered. Constructing
indices of more qualitative regulations such as employment protec-
tion is obviously even more complicated. These indices do well in
cross-sectional comparisons, but they are more problematic for as-
sessing evolutions over time.9 For example, in the 1990s many coun-
tries moved back and forth in the liberalization of temporary contracts,
and this was sometimes accompanied by moves in the opposite direc-
tion concerning the degree of protection for permanent contracts. It
is not easy to determine whether employment protection goes up or
down if a reform makes it harder to use temporary contracts but at
the same time eases the conditions under which a permanent worker
may be dismissed.
It is thus useful to pursue a different approach, namely, to look at
direct quantitative indicators of worker’s rents. The drawback is that
this approach does not specify which reforms have been implemented;
workers’ rents may fall under a number of labor market reforms,
product market reforms, or the sheer pressure of international com-
petition. It does, however, provide an idea of the evolution of the true
degree of competition in labor markets, and it can help one avoid
misclassifying a policy change or taking one seriously when it actu-
ally has only second-order effects on labor market flexibility or when
is not enforced. To measure rents, I use two different approaches:
the interindustry approach and the transition approach, which are de-
scribed in the next two sections.
3. THE INTERINDUSTRY APPROACH
The first approach exploits variation of wages across industries.
This empirical regularity was much studied in the 1980s and 1990s,
following Krueger and Summers (1988). The literature shows that
these differentials are not associated with compensating differentials
for working conditions or nonwage benefits or with unobservable
worker heterogeneity. On the other hand, they are correlated with a
number of industry characteristics—such as union density, capital
9. Indeed, indices such as the one in Bertola (1990) are typically used for
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intensity, and product market competition—that are likely to be as-
sociated with the rent that can be extracted by workers and their
power to do so. In other words, there is a strong presumption that
differences in wages between industries represent differences in rents
rather than anything else. Therefore, I analyze the evolution of labor
market rents over time in a number of European countries by look-
ing at trends in the estimated coefficients of a wage equation, in an
individual data set, with industry dummies. If rents are falling over
time, then I expect the dispersion in these coefficients across sectors
to be falling, too: in a rent-free economy, they would all be equal to
zero. Assuming that the least-paying sector is more or less perfectly
competitive, I define an average rent by looking at the employment-
weighted average of the difference between a sector’s coefficient and
that of the least-paying sector. That alternative measure captures
changes in the rent that are due to labor reallocation from high-rent
to low-rent sectors, whereas the dispersion measure gives an indica-
tion of the evolution of the rent in a given sector.
The data is the European Household Panel Survey. The advan-
tage of this data set is that it includes data on wages, individual char-
acteristics, and labor market status, which are consistent across
countries and available for all European Union (EU) members. Its
panel dimension allows me to control for unobserved heterogeneity
among individuals by making use of fixed-effect estimators. The draw-
backs are that it has fewer observations than a typical national labor-
force survey and that data for Germany and the United Kingdom are
not available after 1996.
I estimate wage equations for each of the countries, in which
each observation is an individual at a given date. The specification is
where TDs is a time dummy for date s (TDit
s = 1 if t = s and 0 other-
wise); IDk is an industry dummy for industry k (IDit
k = 1 if individual
i works in industry k at date t and 0 otherwise); T is the number of
periods; and the other variables are self-explanatory.
The above equation can be estimated with and without individual
fixed effects. The fixed effects eliminate potential sources of bias like
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unobserved ability are more likely to work in certain industries, then
part of the industry dummy reflects the return to unobserved ability
rather than a rent. The earlier literature finds that interindustry
wage differentials are typically robust to the introduction of individual
fixed effects, although the coefficients are somewhat smaller than
when the specifications are run without fixed effects.10
Next, I construct synthetic indicators of labor market rents by
first defining the spread indicator for any date, s, as
This equation captures the difference in wages for similar work-
ers in the best-paying and the worst-paying sectors. If the worst-pay-
ing sector is interpreted as perfectly competitive, then the spread
indicator is a measure of the highest rent paid to workers in that
economy, irrespective of the number of workers who earn the rent.11
It would fail to capture a reduction in rents stemming from a fall in
the employment share of the best-paying sectors. I therefore also
compute an average rent indicator (ARENT) for date s as follows:
where nks is the number of people employed in industry k at date s
and where cjkN = 0 by extension.12
ARENT measures the average rent earned by a worker in that
economy, as compared with the least-paying sector. If that sector is com-
petitive, ARENT also provides an idea of the welfare difference, in annu-
ity terms, between an employed person and an unemployed person.
max min . Sk s k s k k
SPREAD c c =−
,
10. See Saint-Paul (1996a) for a survey.
11. For date s = 1, the formula is slightly different:
12. For s = 1 the formula is again slightly different:
11 max(max ,0) min(min ,0) . kk s k k
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Once these indicators are constructed, I look at their evolution
over time in each country. One shortcoming with the data used is
that they are only available for seven consecutive years (three for
Germany and the United Kingdom), which may cause problems if
there are long lags between reforms and their effects on labor mar-
ket competition. I also perform another exercise, namely, looking at
wage differentials across size categories of firms rather than indus-
tries, using the same methodology.
4. THE TRANSITION APPROACH
The second approach, in the spirit of Cohen (1999), estimates a
dynamic process for individual transitions between employment and
unemployment and uses the estimated coefficients to compute the
present discounted value of being employed and the present discounted
value of being unemployed for any given category of worker. The
difference between the two represents the total rent of the employed.
Assume that for a given category of workers, individuals move
between two states, employed and unemployed. The transition rate
from employment to unemployment is s; the transition rate from
unemployment to employment is h. The income in unemployment is
b, and the income in employment is w. The real interest rate is r.
Workers are risk neutral.
Then, the evolution equation for the value of being employed, Ve,
defined as the expected present discounted value of income flows when
employed, is the following:
Similarly, the evolution equation for the value of being unemployed,
Vu, is
In the steady state, the total rent—defined as the difference between
the utility of the employed and that of the unemployed (that is, by
Q = (Ve – Vu)—is
.
() . e eu e rVw s VVV =+ − +
.







Another concept of interest is the cost per unit of time to the em-
ployer of having to pay the rent, Q, in addition to the worker’s alter-
native wage. It is given by the annuity equivalent of the rent, Q, that
is, q = (r + s)Q :
While the total rent, Q, is measured in terms of workers’ welfare, the
annuity rent q expresses the same concept from the point of view of
the firm’s labor cost. The rent, q, tells us how much firms have to pay
workers per unit of time in addition to their alternative wage, rVu:
q = w – rVu. The two differ because welfare can be transferred to
workers not only in the form of wages, but in the form of job security.
The rent, q, goes up with s, because a higher job loss rate reduces the
welfare of unemployed workers, since their prospective jobs do not
last as long. It goes down with h for the opposite reason. In contrast,
Q falls with s, because the employed workers are worse off when
their jobs are insecure, all else equal. Nevertheless, the gap between
their wage and their alternative wage widens.
In principle, if I can estimate transition rates between employ-
ment and unemployment, as well as the income of the employed and
the unemployed, then I can compute Q and q.
The most important shortcoming with that approach is that if w,
b, s, and h have different cyclical elasticities, variations in q and Q
over a period of a few years are as likely to result from the influence
of business cycles as from underlying changes in the degree of labor
market competition. To control for that possibility, I pool all the coun-
tries together and impose a common response of these variables to
country-specific business cycle conditions. This leads to the following
specification:
where Yit is one of the four variables of interest, w, s, b, and h (de-
fined below); and P is the number of countries. There are three blocks.
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where           is a country dummy. The second block captures the effect
of individual characteristics, assuming country-specific responses. The
third block captures the effect of the business cycle: Uit is the unemploy-
ment rate in the country where the individual observation is located,
and GDPit is the country’s real GDP. The coefficients are assumed com-
mon across countries, which allows identification. The structural break
dummies, SBit, are defined by
These allow me to compute the country-specific change in w, s, b,
and h between the two subperiods defined by equation (3).
A second shortcoming with the approach is that it is difficult to get
reliable estimates of b, the unemployment benefit payments, from the
data. The problem is that the database is silent about the flow of unem-
ployment benefits payments. Rather, unemployment benefits payments
are reported for the whole year, and there appears to be a lag between
unemployment spells and the actual payment of corresponding ben-
efits. My attempts to solve this issue using econometric methods failed
in that they yielded estimates for ∆b that are not plausible for many
countries and that do not match the evolution of unemployment ben-
efits replacement ratios over time as estimated by the OECD.
I therefore use equation (2) only for estimating ∆w, ∆s, and ∆h.
The three variables of interest are defined as follows: lnwit is the log of
individual earnings for an employed person, in which case the regres-
sion is estimated using only observations such that the individual is
employed at t (regression 1); EDit is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual
is employed at t, in which case the regression uses only observations
such that the individual was unemployed at t – 1 (regression 2); and
UDit is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is unemployed at t, in which
case the regression uses only observations such that the individual was
employed at t – 1 (regression 3). The coefficient aj1 represents the change
in the relevant variable between the two subperiods. As for ∆b, I use
estimates of the benefit replacement ratio, ρ = b/w, in the first subperiod
as reported by Nickell (2003).13
0 1   if   . it SB t t =>
(3)
13. One problem with that study is that its estimate of the replacement ratio
for Italy in the second subperiod is unreliable. A discussion by the author with
Pietro Ichino suggests progressive moving toward a replacement ratio of 0.4 in the
second subperiod, starting in 1997, and a value of 0.26 in the first one, while
estimating a version of equation (1) yields an increase in ∆lnρ of just 0.02 between
the two subperiods. As a reasonable compromise, I take ρ = (0.26 + 0.40)/2 = 0.33
in the second subperiod.
j
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For any country, this allows me to compute the average change
in the total rent:
or, equivalently,
This number is computed using the average unconditional values of
w, b, h, and s in the first subsample (t = 1,… S) and r = 0.03. Simi-
larly, I can compute the change in the rent in annuity terms:
5. RESULTS I: THE INTERINDUSTRY APPROACH
The estimated industry coefficients are highly significant and typi-
cally range up to 50–60 percent. In some cases the number of obser-
vations is too low in a given time ×  country ×  industry cell, and the
coefficient cannot be used. I have therefore dropped Luxembourg,
Greece, and years 1999 and 2000 for Belgium. Also, the Panel stops
in 1996 for Germany and the United Kingdom, and it starts in 1995
for Austria and in 1996 for Finland. Finally, the Netherlands includes
what is probably an aberrant observation in 1998, owing to a sharp
drop in the estimated industry dummy coefficient for textiles.
The tables in this section report the results for the two rent indica-
tors, SPREAD and ARENT. In table 1, the SPREAD measure fluctu-
ates in all countries, but it does not seem to follow any clear trend. In
other words, the rent of the best-paid workers relative to their charac-
teristics does not seem to vanish. The exceptions are Austria, where
rents seem to go down, and Finland and the Netherlands, where they
go up. Overall, the results confirm the findings of Krueger and Sum-
mers (1988) that interindustry wage differentials are quite persistent
over time.
Table 2 reports the results for the ARENT measure. Most coun-
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average rent. In the cases of Spain and Italy, the measure is remark-
ably stable. Again, the rent seems to have gone down in Austria, and
to have gone up in Finland.14
14. One shortcoming is that the results are substantially driven by the differ-
ence between the agricultural sector and all other sectors, as the former pays
considerably lower wages than the rest. This would not be a problem if, for ex-
ample, the agricultural sector pays no rent at all—such that people are indifferent
between working in that sector and being unemployed—while all other sectors
pay rents that are similar. However, no clear pattern emerged when I dropped the
agricultural sector from my computations of the rent indicators.
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Table 1. Evolution of SPREAD



































































































Table 2. Evolution of ARENT





















































































These results may be driven by sectors with too few observa-
tions, which would imply a potentially volatile associated coefficient.
To check for that, I constructed alternative estimates of ARENT and
SPREAD, which use only sectors with more than a hundred observa-
tions in the first wave. This means that the variables are defined
using a different set of industries in different countries, but that is
unimportant here because I am not comparing the average level of
the rent across countries. The results for ARENT (reported in table
3) are slightly different from those of table 2. Rents now seem to go
down in Ireland and perhaps France and Italy, and to go up again in
Finland, with no clear pattern elsewhere. In particular, they no longer
seem to be falling in Austria.
The usual problem of unobserved heterogeneity among workers also
applies. I therefore also computed the fixed effect estimator. One prob-
lem, though, is that if people do not move much between industries,
then such a panel, with relatively few periods and observations, is likely
to present fixed effects that are highly collinear with the vectors of
industry dummies. The following results should thus be taken with
caution. As shown in table 4, the estimated spread is quite volatile,
although there is still evidence of a downward trend in rents in Aus-
tria. Also, in many countries, rents computed using the fixed effect
estimators are smaller than under random effects, as expected.
When fixed effects are applied to the average rent, a few strange
phenomena arise, like the quasi-disappearance of the average rent in
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Table 3. Evolution of ARENT, Robust Definition
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France, Spain, and Italy (see table 5). Again, the measure seems highly
volatile, but there is still a downward trend in Austria.
To conclude, no country demonstrates a clear trend. There is mild
evidence of falling rents in Austria and Ireland, but it is not robust
across estimators. If I had to choose a preferred estimation, however, I
would opt for that of table 3, which is based on the least volatile esti-
mates of the interindustry dummies. That table suggests a sharp drop
of rents in Ireland but not elsewhere.
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Table 4. Evolution of SPREAD, Fixed Effects



































































































Table 5. Evolution of ARENT, Fixed Effects






















































































While interindustry wage differentials are the most widely docu-
mented and discussed phenomenon, one may also want to look at wage
differentials in other dimensions. Hence, I also present results from
partitioning by firm size instead of by industry (see tables 6 and 7). I
replaced the industry dummies with two size dummies for the regres-
sion, corresponding to three size categories: fewer than 100 employees,
100–500 employees, and more than 500 employees. The results look
somewhat more plausible and of better quality than those obtained based
on interindustry differences, but unfortunately they do not confirm the
early results. Rather, they suggest that rents are declining in Belgium,
France, Ireland, Italy (mildly), Portugal, and the United Kingdom,
while they seem to be rising in the Netherlands and Spain—two coun-
tries where unemployment actually fell over the period! Rents are stable
in other countries. Thus, the only country for which these estimates
support those of the previous section is Ireland.
To conclude, the interindustry approach does not suggest a system-
atic pattern of falling rents in Europe. When it does for a given coun-
try, the decline does not seem to be related to any fall in unemployment
in the corresponding country. Finally, breaking down industries by
sector of activity or firm size generates different results. The only in-
ference, if any, that one can confidently make from the exercise is that
rents have fallen in Ireland.
One potential problem with the approach is that labor market lib-
eralization may have conflicting effects on the estimated rents. On the
one hand, it eliminates pure rents that are not the return to productive
ability. On the other, it removes wage compression induced by regula-
tion and collective bargaining, which may widen wage differentials by
increasing the return to unobserved ability, match-specific human capi-
tal, and so on. If these latter factors are more present in some indus-
tries than others, then measured interindustry differences may well
widen. A fixed effects estimator does not solve that problem: a given
individual will earn different returns in different years if these years
are associated with a different regulatory environment.
My provisional conclusion, however, is that there is no firm ground
for believing that European labor markets have generally become more
competitive in the 1990s on the basis of these estimates.Did European Labor Markets Become More Competitive 297
6. RESULTS II: THE TRANSITION APPROACH
This section presents the results of the transition approach to mea-
suring rents. Unfortunately, they are not much more conclusive than
the previous exercise, in part because of data problems.
Table 8 reports the evolution of rents under four alternative measures.
The two unadjusted rents are defined in section 4. The two adjusted rents
deflate the unadjusted ones to allow for growth. (They subtract the ex-
pected difference in GDP between the two subperiods on the basis of aver-
age GDP growth between 1980 and 2000.) If the rents grow slower than the
Year













Table 6. Evolution of SPREAD, Size Differentials
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economy, in the long run they account for a negligible fraction of labor
costs and the economy converges toward a competitive labor market.
Thus, the first two columns express rents in real consumption units,
while the last two columns express them relative to GDP.
A first aspect of the results is that they are not very robust: rents
are quite sensitive to whether the specification allows for growth, and
the evolution of the total rent, Q, often diverges from that of the rent
per unit of time. This suggests that changes in the separation rate, s,
play a quantitatively important role in the results (in that an increase
in s reduces Q but increases q, all else equal). The evolution of rents
again is not closely related to that of unemployment over the period.
However, the adjusted ∆Q/Q does a better job than the other measures;
its correlation with the change in unemployment is 0.3. This measure
would thus appear to be the preferred one. On that basis, these esti-
mates suggest a more optimistic conclusion than the interindustry
approach: rents fall significantly in four countries (Austria, Belgium,
Finland, and Ireland), and they fall moderately in three other coun-
tries (Denmark, France, and Italy).
7. CONCLUSION
This paper has provided some quantitative evidence on the evolu-
tion of labor market competition in Europe in the 1990s, based on
various estimates of labor market rents. The results are rather in-
conclusive, probably as a result of the quality of the data. A general
conclusion is that there is no strong evidence that labor markets
became either more or less competitive in any European country
over that period. One exception seems to be Ireland, though, for which
a number of estimated rents fell significantly over the period.
Unadjusted Adjusted
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